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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAll 
ROBERT E. CALL, EVERETT H. 
CALL and ANN D • CAL.t. , 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents , 
'?IMBER LAKES CORPORATION, ) 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF 
) 
Appeal from the District r'"n~h 
Judicial District In and For Wasatdi~· 
Honorable J. Robert 
* • * * * * * * • • * * 
ADAMS, KASTING & ANDERSON 
John S • Adams 
Suite 200, The Glass Factory 
&¥row Press Square 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT E. CALL, EVERETT H. 
CALL and ANN D. CALL, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
Case No. 14839 
TIMBER LAKES CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Respondents for a Declaratory 
Judgment declaring a certain contract for sale of real 
property, dated November 6, 1971, by and between the parties, 
to be in full force and effect and adjudicating the respective 
rights and duties of the parties under and pursuant to the 
provisions of said contract. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
A nonjury trial was held in the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District in and for Wasatch County, State of 
Utah before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock. Pursuant to his 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (set out in more 
detail in Appellant's Statement of Facts), Judge Bullock 
entered a Memorandum Decision reinstating the contract upon 
payment by Respondents to Appellant of all delinquent pay-
ments and accrued interest together with costs (not attorney's 
fees) within fifteen days from the date of judgment. 
This appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah pursuant to Rule 72 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents ask this Court to affirm the judgment of 
the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents accept generally the facts set forth 
in Appellant's brief with the following minor additions. 
Although there is a conflict in the testimony, it is the 
position of the Respondents that prior to termination of 
the ten day notice furnished them by letter of December 121 
ff · rs of 1974, they did, in fact, contact responsible o ice 
Appellant company in response to such notice. 
(see transcript 
of trial, page 14, lines 19 through 27.) It is noted further 
h · f December 10' 19 741 and that the time between t e notice o 
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the offer of payment by the Respondents was, in fact, twenty-
two rather than twenty-three days as set forth in Appellant's 
statement. 
ARGUMENT 
UNDER ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE THE 
TEN DAYS SPECIFIED IN THE LETTER OF DECEMBER 12, 
1974, IN WHICH THE CONTRACT WAS TO BE BROUGHT 
CURRENT WAS NOT A REASONABLE TIME AND TWENTY-TWO 
DAYS WAS NOT AN UNREASONABLE TIME FOR RESPONDENTS 
TO TENDER PERFORMANCE AFTER NOTICE. 
The cases cited by Appellant represent those cases which 
most strongly present and represent its position. Included 
are cases which speak of a so-called waiver of rights by 
the Seller and the need for notice after delinquencies. 
With these we have no quarrel. But the two cases in fact 
relied upon by Appellant to state its case are Pacific 
Development Company vs. Stewart, 113 u. 403, 195 P. 2d 748 
(1948) and Fullmer vs. Blood U. 2d ~~~~' 546 P. 2d 
606 (1976) • In those cases the court upheld the right of the 
Seller to terminate the interest of the Buyer under facts 
and upon conditions which the court found to be reasonable 
under all the circumstances. As suggested by Appellant's 
brief, "each case must be considered on its own facts and 
what may be reasonable time in one case may not be reasonable 
in another" . 
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Both of Appellant's cases may be d'l d' 
rea i y is tinguished fr:· 
the one here to be decided. 
We look first at Pacific Development Company vs. Ste·: 
supra. Notwithstanding the extensive quotations from thi: 
case used by the Appellant in support of its ccntentions, 
the real holding of the case is this: 
We hold that twenty-three days was a 
reasonable time to allow Defendant to 
make up the overdue payments under the 
circumstances of this case. (Page 751) 
The significant and controlling difference between 
Pacific Development Company vs. Stewart, supra, and the 
present case is simple. In Pacific, the Sellers were give:. 
a right to foreclose because they had given the Buyers 
twenty-three days to pay the delinquency and the Buyers he 
not done so. In our case, the Buyers tendered the full 
delinquency within twenty-two days (twelve days past the 
deadline) and the tender was refused by the Seller. It is 
the testimony of Respondents that their tender of the fuli 
delinquency was within the period approved by the Appellan: 
Seller. (See Transcript of Trial page 14, lines 19 throus" 
30, page 15, full page, and page 16, lines 1 through 29 ·1 
. . . t certain At trial there was conflicting testimony as 0 
. . . derstanding, facts and dates, due to fabrication, misun 
· k · Based upon thi's conflicting mista e, or poor memories. -
. th found that there was no testimony, e lower court 
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--
representation, commitment, or agreement that the time for 
bringing the contract current would be extended beyond 
December 22, 1974. More significantly for our purposes here, 
however, the trial court did find that there was some contact 
between the parties following the notice and prior to January 
3, 1975. (See paragraph 5 of Findings of Fact.} Based 
upon all the evidence and after sifting certain conflicting 
testimony and appraising the demeanor of the witnesses, 
Judge Bullock entered as paragraph 6 and 8 of his Findings 
of Fact the following: 
6. On January 3, 1975, Plaintiffs 
offered to then bring the contract current 
by paying all delinquent payments and 
accumulated interest and were ready and 
able to do so, but such offer was refused 
by the Defendant. 
********** 
8. Under all the circumstances of 
this case, the ten days specified in the 
letter of December 12, 1974, in which the 
contract was to be brought current was 
not a reasonable time and twenty-two days 
was not an unreasonable time for Plaintiffs 
to tender performance after notice. 
As indicated by references to Transcript of Trial in the 
Paragraph above at pages 14, 15, and 16 the testimony of 
Respondents is clearly to the effect that in their minds at 
least they were still negotiating this matter, both as to 
time and amount, right up to the date they tendered payment 
- 5 -
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of the delinquency, to-wit, January 3, 1975. They were 
not unaware or nor indifferent to the need to do somethin1 
to cure the delinquency. They clearly wanted to retain 
their interest in the con tract. They were, however, 
limited in this regard not only by their own circumstance:, 
but by the actions of the Sellers. It is true as argued 
by Appellant that Respondents did not plead hardship as 
a reason for their failure to make timely tender. However, 
the testimony of Respondents is that on the due date 
given in the notice they asked for and received additional 
time at the end of which period they tendered full payment 
of the delinquency. While testimonies differ as to the 
dates and efforts, the fact is that the Respondents were 
trying to and finally did tender payment within what the 
court below considered under all the circumstances to have 
been a reasonable period. 
Next, in Appellant's case of Full.mer vs. Blood, supra, 
in which Sellers were permitted to terminate the rights 
of purchasers, note that it was nearly two months before 
11 r's purchasers made any effort to comply with the Se e 
demand. · th' case is The language of the court in is 
significant: 
We do not confront the specific 
problem as to whether the giving of 
five days notice to make the one 
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yearly payment or suffer forfeiture 
was a reasonable time. The question 
is whether it was a reasonable demand 
under the terms 0£ the contract and 
the total circumstances to which the 
court looks in making that determination. 
The facts are that Dean Fullmer wrote 
the letter on March 26, 1974, requiring 
that one annual payment be made within 
five days .........•• and it was not until 
nearly two months later on June 5, that 
the Defendants made any effort to 
comply with the demand by offering to 
pay one annual payment. 
This is in sharp contrast to the efforts of the Respondents 
in the present case, whose testimony is that they tried to 
contact Appellant the day before the deadline, did contact 
Appellant the day of the deadline, received assurance that 
they would have until January 3, to pay (again recognizing 
the difference in the testimony as hereinabove referred to) 
and on January 3, did, in fact, tender full payment of the 
delinquency. However the conflicting evidence is viewed by 
the Court and whichever witnesses the Court chooses to believe, 
that is a far different set 0£ circumstances than those in 
Fullmer vs. Blood, supra, where the Defendant made no effort 
to comply for nearly two months. As argued elsewhere in this 
brief, the trial court heard the conflicting testimony and 
determined that the efforts of Respondents were adequate to 
insulate them against forfeiture. 
The case of Fullmer vs. Blood, supra, also sets forth 
What th 15 Court has called in another matter "the traditional 
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rule of review" 
2d 673 (1971)). 
Court said: 
(Jensen vs. Nielsen, 26 u. 2d 96 , 485 P, 
At page 610 of Fullmer vs. Blood, the 
A suit of this nature involving the 
invocation of the forfeiture and/or 
the enforcement of a purchase contract 
invokes consideration of the 
principles of equity which address 
themselves to the conscience and 
discretion of the trial court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellant's brief at page 6 quotes First Security Bar.\ 
of Utah vs. Demiris, 10 U. 2d 405, 354 P. 2d 79, insupp:ir: 
of its contentions that the Supreme· Court need not accept 
the findings of the lower court, but has the prerogative 
to modify or make new findings. A reading of the first 
half of the paragraph relied upon by Appellant rather than 
just the second half of the said paragraph sets forth the 
duty of the Supreme Court in such a matter: 
It is to be recognized that in 
reviewing the Findings of Fact, we 
should indulge considerable latitude 
to the findings of the trial court 
and should not disturb them unless 
the evidence clearly preponderates 
to the contrary. (Pages 98 and 99) 
(Emphasis added.) 
h "d si"mi"larly i·n re crande~ The Supreme Court as sai ----
Estate, 9 u. 2d 161, 340 P. 2d 760 (1959): 
Accordingly it is the prerogat~ve 
of this Court to review the evidence 
upon which the said order was based. 
Nevertheless, it is our declared 
policy to indulge considerable 
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latitude to the determination made 
by the trial court, and not to 
disturb his judgment unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against 
it. (Emphasis added. ) 
rt is respectfully submitted to this Court that in the 
case at hand not only does the evidence not clearly preponderate 
against the findings of the trial court, but rather clearly 
supports such findings and judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court found that Respondents had paid approxi-
mately $3,181.00 on a $10,000.00 purchase of real property: 
they had been delinquent on several occasions and had been 
permitted by the Appellant to make up the payments. On 
December 12, 1974, they were served a ten-day notice as a 
result of which they contacted and negotiated with Appellant 
company and on Ja11uary 3, 1975, tendered full payments of 
the delinquency. Payment was refused by the Seller. 
Recognizing that the law generally does not favor 
forfeitures and under the settled principle that in reviewing 
an equity matter, the Supreme court's declared policy is to 
indulge considerable latitude to the determination made by 
the trial court, Respondents respectfully request this Court 
to affirm the findings of the lower court and to uphold its 
judgment "that upon tender by Plaintiffs to the Defendant 
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of delinquent payments and interest in the amount of 
$4,832.59, plus costs by September 11, 1976, the contrac: 
between the parties is ordered reinstated and in full 
force and effect". 
Respondents further pray for an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs expended in responding to the 
appeal. 
Dated this 24th day of February, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~L 
RUSSELL C. HARRIS 
320 South 300 East, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respo: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
"" ... I hereby certify that on the ---~- ;-~~day of February, 
1977, two true and correct copies 0£ the foregoing Brief 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to John S. Adams, Adams, 
Kasting & _Anderson, Attorney for Appellant, Suite 200, The 
Glass Factory, Arrow Press Square, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
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